Efficient Windows and Labor Force Reduction by Robin L. Lumsdaine et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES









This paper is part of NBERs research programs in Aging and Labor Studies. Any
opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the National
Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #3369
May 1990
EFFICIENT WINDOWS AND LABOR FORCE REDUCTION
ABSTRACT
Recently many U.S. firma have offered "window" plans that provide bonuses
to a group of workers if the worker retires within a specified short time
span. This paper examines a window plan at a Fortune 500 firm, and addresses
two main issues. First, what was the effect of the window plan on departures?
Second, assuming a variety of possible firm objectives, what would be the
design of an efficient window plan? These questions are addressed using the
retirement model in Stock and Wise [l988a, l988b] .Themodel, estimated using
data for an earlier year, predicts well out-of-sample the subsequent large
increase in retirements under the window plan. We find that while the firm
successfully msximized departures, if its goal was to minimize either expected
future wage payments or the current cost per induced retirement, the firm
could have saved more with efficient plans constructed using the model. One
interpretation is that the firm was primarily interested in reducing the
overall size of the labor force or in retiring older employees to allow
promotion of younger employees.
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Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138In recent years many U.S. firms have offered "window" plans that provide
incentives for older workers to retire early. Window plans provide special
bonuses to a specific group of workers -- oftendefined by age, occupational
group, or even a division within the firm -- ifthe worker retires within a
specified period of time, typically a year or less. The apparent goal of such
plans is either to reduce the salary cost of older employees or to reduce the
size of the older labor force, possibly without primary concern for total
labor cost. Some firm executives emphasize that by inducing employees in
higher level positions to retire such plans can enhance promotion
possibilities for younger employees. Others emphasize that such plans are a
convenient way to reduce the overall size of the workforce without resorting
to layoffs. Another possibility is that firms use the window plan to induce
older workers to retire because their salaries would exceed their marginal
products, were they to continue working. This is in line with the theoretical
proposition of Lazear (1979] ,thatdefined benefit pension plans serve this
purpose in general. The window plan might be an additional inducement
motivated by the same goal. With these possible goals in mind, this paper
considers the potential effects of "optimal" window plans. To focus the
discussion and to demonstrate the effects of window plans, the analysis is
*Financial support was provided by the National Institute on Aging, grant
numbers R37 A0O8146 and T32 AGOO186, the Hoover Institution, and the National
Science Foundation.(2)
applied to the experience of a large Fortune 500 firm. We consider whether
the window plan in this firm was as efficient as it could have been; was there
another plan that could have done the job better?
The analysis relies on the option value model developed in earlierpapers
[Stock and Wise 1988a and 1988b] and used to analyze the retirement incentives
of defined benefit pension plans. About 50 percent of workers in theUnited
States have firm pension plans. Approximately 75 percent of these are covered
by defined benefit plansj The typical defined benefit pension plan provides
substantial incentive for workers to retire early, often as young as 55. Most
window plans can be treated as temporary changes in the provisions of firm
pension plans.
Firm pension plan coverage expanded quickly in the late 1940's and the
1950's, after 1942 legislation that made contributions to pension funds tax
deductible. Although totsl coverage has not changed much in recent years, the
proportion of workers that retires with a firm plan is still increasing. The
rapid increase of pension plan coverage has been accompanied by a dramatic
decrease in the labor force participation of older workers, as shown by the
following data for men:
Male Labor Force Psrticioation Rates, by Age
Year 50-54 55-59 60-64 65+
1971 92.8 88.8 74.1 25.5
1986 88.9 79.0 54.9 17.5
1The others are covered by defined contributionplans. Under these
plans, the pension benefit is determined by contributions to the firm pension
fund, which are in turn usually set at a percentage of salary earnings.
Defined contribution plans typically have none of the incentive effects of
defined benefit plans, as described below.(3)
The juxtaposition of these two trends suggests that the quantitative effects
on retirement of firm pension plan provisions may have been substantial.
The incentive effects of these plans have been emphasized in several
recent papers. Bulow (1981] described pension wealth accrual under such plans
and Lazear [1983] emphasized the potential role of plan provisions in inducing
early retirement as a substitute for mandatory retirement. The very
substantial incentive effects of these plans have been emphasized most
recently by Kotlikoff and Wise [1985, 1987, 1989], who summarize the
incentives of approximately 2500 plans covered by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics Level of Benefits Survey and consider in detail the effects of the
provisions of the same Fortune 500 firm whose data is used in this paper.
This work demonstrates that the typical firm plan provides a large reward for
remaining with the firm until some age, often the early retirement age, and
then a substantial inducement to leave the firm, often as early as 55. Almost
all plans incorporate a large penalty for working past age 65. The gain in
wage earnings from working an additional year is often offset in large part by
a loss in the present value of future pension benefits.
An early analysis of firm retirement is presented in Burkhauser [1979].
Fields and Mitchell (1982] also consider the incentive effects of firm plans.
Hogarth [1988) analyzes the acceptance of an early retirement bonus. The
immediate antecedent of our work is Lazear and Moore [1988], who argue that
the option value of postponing retirement is the appropriate variable to enter
in a regression equation explaining retirement.2 The analysis by Stock and
2lndeed it was their work and analysis of military retirement rates by
Phillips and Wise [1987] that motivated the Stock and Wise option value
approach.(4)
Wise [l988a and l988b) formalizes an option value model of retirement and
demonstrates that these plans do indeed have a powerful effect on employee
retirement decisions. Based on data from the Fortune 500 firm used in this
paper, they showed that increasing the age of early retirement from 55 to 60,
for example, would increase by 35 percent the proportion of persons employed
at 50 who are still employed by the firm at age 60. They also showed that
changes in Social Security provisions would have little effect on retirement
rates in this firm, largely because most firm employees have retired before
the Social Security early and normal retirement ages, 62 and 65 respectively.
This paper uses the option value model to examine the potential effect of
window plans. To understand the effect of these plans, it is first necessary
to understand the retirement incentive implications of the firm's permanent
pension plan. A brief description of the firm plan, borrowed in large part
from Stock and Vise [l988a], is presented in section I. The model that is
used to analyze retirement is summarized in section II. To support the
subsequent selection of optimal window plans, two results are emphasized:
first, the firm's window plan dramatically increased firm departure rates,
and, second, the option value retirement model predicts well these very large
increases in retirement rates. In addition to the choice of an optimal window
plan, the central focus of this paper, the firm window allows a unique
external test of the predictive validity of the retirement -model; we compare
our predictions against actual retirement rates under the window plan.3 The
model is first estimated for male non-managerial office employees, using data
for 1980, a year in which no window plan was available. The model is then
3More detail on this aspect of the analysis, which is only summarized in
this paper, is presented in Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise [1989].(5)
used to predict the effect of the window plan that was offered two years
later, in 1982. This firm had not offered previous window plans and according
to firm executives the 1982 plan was unanticipated by employees. Thus
prediction of departure rates under the plan provides a true out-of-sample
test of the predictive validity of the model.4 The results show that the
model predicts well the effects of the window plan adopted by the firm. We
then consider in section III how an "optimal' plan could be designed, and what
the effects of such a plan would be.
Although to motivate the analysis we consider how well the firm's plan
worked relative to potential alternative plans with similar characteristics,
the primary intent is to demonstrate that window plans can be a powerful
managerial tool with strong incentive effects, and to demonstrate how such
plans could be designed. The provisions of optimal plans are chosen in
accordance with the parameter estimates of the retirement model.
The firm's plan was apparently chosen on the basis of educated hunches of
firm personnel. In contrast, we choose an "optimal" plan based on our
estimated model of retirement behavior, together with an objective function.
We find that an optimal plan chosen to minimize expected future salaries paid
to older employees could have saved much more than the firms plan, measured
by reduction in salaries per bonus dollar. Thus if this were its goal, the
firm could have chosen a more efficient mechanism to achieve it. We also show
that an optimal plan could reduce substantially the current cost of the window
plan per induced retirement. Although the results provide no direct evidence
on the motivation of the firm in initiating a window plan, the analysis
4The estimates in the earlier Stock-Wise papers were based on salesmen,
who were not eligible for the window plan.(6)
supports some qualified conclusions about possible motivations for such plans.
Section IV is a summary.
I. The Firm Pension Plan and The Temporary Window.
A. The Firm Pension Plan.
The analysis is based on male (non-managerial) office employees who are
at least 50 years old and have been employed for at least three years.5 The
data reflect the retirement behavior of a random sample of 1000 employees who
were in the firm on January 1, 1980. The data, obtained from firm personnel
records, follow these employees through 1985. Individual earnings histories
are available beginning in 1969, or from the date of hire if the employee was
hired after 1969.
To understand the effect of the pension plan provisions, figure 1 shows
the expected future compensation of a person from our sample who is 50 years
old and has been employed by the firm for 20 years.6 It is important to
consider total compensation --includingwage earnings, the accrual of pension
benefits, and the accrual of Social Security benefits. As compensation for
working another year the employee receives salary earnings. He also receives
compensation in the form of future pension benefits. The annual compensation
in this form is the change in the present value of the future pension benefits
entitlement, due to working an additional year. This accrual is comparable to
5The criterion that they be employed three years facilitates the
forecasting of future wage earnings on an individual basis.
6The graphs assume a 5 percent real discount rate and zero inflation. In
the empirical model that is estimated, the discount rate is estimated and the
inflation rate is assumed to be 5 percent.(7)
wage earnings. The accrual of Social Security benefits also may be calculated
in a similar manner, and is also comparable to wage earnings. Figure 1 shows
the present value at age 50 of expected future compensation in all three
forms. The line labelled wage earnings represents cumulated earnings, by age
of retirement.7 For example, if the person were to retire at age 62, his
cumulated earnings between age 50 and age 62, discounted to age 50 dollars
would be about $126,000. (All dollar amounts are in 1980 dollars.) The slope
of the earnings line represents annual earnings discounted to age 50 dollars.
The solid line shows the accrual of firm pension plus Social Security
benefits, again discounted to age 50 dollars. The shape of this profile is
determined primarily by the pension plan provisions. The plan's normal
retirement age is 65 and the early retirement age is 55. Cliff vesting occurs
at ten years of service.8 Normal retirement benefits at age 65 are determined
by age times years of service, times a multiplier. The most important
additional provisions -- thosethat determine the shape of the profile in
figure 1 --aredescribed here.9 The present value of retirement benefits
increases between 50 and 54 because years of service, and possibly earnings,
increase. If a vested employee were to leave the firm at age 53, for example,
he would be entitled to normal retirement pension benefits at age 65, based on
his years of service and current dollar earnings at age 53. He could start to
7Departure from the firm would be a more accurate description than
retirement, because for some employees the alternative to continued employment
at the firm may to be another job, rather than retirement.
8That is, an employee has no pension entitlement before 10years of
service, when he becomes entitled to full benefits determined by the pension
formula.
9Full details of the plan provisions are presented in Kotlikoff and Wise
[1987).(8)
receive benefit payments as early as age 55, the pension early retirement age,
but the benefit amount would be reduced actuarially. Thus in present value
terms, the stream of benefits received beginning at 55 would be equal to the
stream of benefits beginning at 65; the annual benefit amount would be reduced
just enough to offset the receipt of benefits for ten more years. If he
started to receive benefits at age 55, they would be only 36 percent of the
dollar amount he would receive at age 65. If, however, he were to remain in
the firm until the early retirement age, the situation would be quite
different. He would be entitled to normal retirement benefits based on his
years of service and salary at age 55. But if he were to start to receive
them at age 55 the benefits would be reduced less than actuarially, about 3
percent for each year that retirement precedes age 65 instead of the actuarial
rate of 6 or 7 percent.
The plan also has a Social Security offset provision. Pension benefits
are offset by a specified amount, depending on the firm estimate of Social
Security benefits. But if the person takes early retirement, between 55 and
65, the Social Security offset is not applied to benefits received before age
65. These two provisions create the large discontinuous jump in retirement
benefits at age 55 --fromabout $30,000 to $50,000. This increase is
equivalent to more than 150 percent of his annual wage earnings at 55. Thus
there is an enormous bonus for remaining with the firm until that age. After
age 55, however, the person who does not retire foregoes the opportunity of
taking pension benefits on very advantageous terms; thus there is only a
small change in the discounted value of benefits between 55 and 60.
If a person has 30 years of service at age 60, he is entitled to full
normal retirement benefits. No early retirement reduction is applied to(9)
benefits if they are taken then. That is, by continuing to work after age 60
he will no longer gain from fewer years of early retirement reduction, as he
did before age 60.Thus the kink in the profile and the decline thereafter.
The top line shows total compensation. For example, if the employee were
to leave the firm at age 60, his wage earnings between 50 and 60 would be
$114,000, shown by the wage earnings line. Thereafter, he would receive firm
pension plan and Social Security retirement benefits with a present value --
atage 50 -- ofabout $45,000. The sum of the two is about $159,000, shown by
the top line. The large jump at 55 reflects the early retirement provisions
of the pension plan. Total annual compensation declines modestly each year
through age 60 and very rapidly thereafter. After age 62 or 63, total annual
compensation is close to zero. The plot ends at age 70, which was the
mandatory retirement age in this firm over the period of our analysis.
B. The Window Plan
In 1982 the firm introduced a window plan for all non-managerial office
employees. The window plan applied to all employees 55 and older who were
vested in the firm's pension plan. Employees in this age group who retired in
1982 received a bonus, depending on age and years of service. The approximate
number of bonus months is shown in table i.10 The bonus was typically
smallest for the youngest and for the oldest employees and largest for those
who were between 58 and 62 years old.
10The approximation is obtained from the parameterization of bonus plans
used to choose optimal windows. It is discussed below. To avoid potential
identification of the firm, we do not show the actual plan values.(10)
II. The Option Value Model, Parameter Estimates, and Predictive Validity.
A. The Model.
The conceptual model is discussed in detail in Stock and Wise [1988a]
It is described only briefly here. At any given age, based on information
available at that age, we assume that an employee compares the expected value
of retiring at that age with the value of retiring at each age in the future,
through age 70. The difference between the value of immediate retirement
versus the maximum of the values at each future age represents an opportunity
cost of retirement; we refer to it as the option value of postponing
retirement. A person who does not retire this year maintains the option of
retiring at a more advantageous age later on. If the option value is greater
than zero, the person Continues to work; otherwise he retires. With reference
to figure 1, for example, at age 50 the employee would compare the value of
the retirement benefits that he would receive were he to retire then --
approximately$24,000 -.withthe value of wage earnings and retirement
benefits in each future year. The expected value at 60, for example, is about
$159,000. The same calculation is repeated in successive years, using updated
predictions of future wage earnings, and related pension and Social Security
benefits. Future earnings forecasts are based on the individual's past
earnings, as well as the earnings of other persons in the firm.Theprecise
model specification follows.
A person at age t who continues to work will earn Y5 in subsequent years
s. If the person retires at age r, subsequent retirement benefits will be
We suppose that in deciding whether to retire the person weighs the
11These benefits will depend on the person's age and years of service at
retirement and on his earnings history; thus they are a function of the
retirement age.(11)
indirect utility that will be received from future income. Discounted at the
rate P.thevalue of this future stream of income if retirement is at age r is
given by
(1) V(r) —X85tUw(ys)+
where U(Y5) is the indirect utility of future wage income and Ur(Bs(r)) is
the indirect utility of future retirement benefits. The person will not live
past age S.
The person will postpone retirement at age t if the option value -- the
gain from postponing retirement -- isgreater than zero, that is if
(2) Gt(r*) —EtVt(r*)
-EtV(t)> 0
where r* is the age that gives the maximum gain.




where and are individual-specific random effects, assumed to follow a
first order autoregressive process
-
(4a) —s-l+ ws E5l(E5) 0(12)
(4b) — + , —0
The parameter k is to recognize that in considering whether to retire the
utility associated with a dollar of income while retired may be different from
the utility associated with a dollar of income accompanied by work.
Given this specification, the function Gt(r) can be decomposed into two
components
(5) G(r) —g(r)+
where g(r) and (r) distinguish the terms in G(r) containing the random





where 1r(slt) denotes the probability that the person will be alive in year s,
given that he is alive in year t. Given the random Markov assumption, (r)
can be written as
(7) (r) —
— Kt(r)v(13)
where K(r) —rl(flp)st,r(sIt)and — - ThusG(r) can by
written as
(8) G(r) —g(r)+
If the person is to retire in year t, G(r) must be less than zero for
every potential retirement age r in the future. If rt is the r that yields
the maximum value of g(r)/K(r). the probability of retirement becomes
(9) Pr[Retire in year t} —Pr[g(rt)/K(rt)< vt]
Consistent with equation (4), v5 follows a first order autoregressive process
that we assume to be Gaussian. Thus
(10) —
pa..51+ €, i.i.d.
The estimates in this paper are based on retirement decisions in only one
year (1980) and the random terms in equation (4) are assumed to follow a
random walk, with p —1.12
8.Parameter Estimates.
The maximum likelihood parameter estimates and standard errors are:
12Estimates for salesmen based on several consecutiveyears and with p
estimated are reported in Stock and Wise [1988a]. These generalizations have
little effect on the estimates.(14)
a is I
0.523 1.483 0.014 0.156
(0.066) (0.303) (0.011) (0.023)
The risk sversion parsmeter y is .523. Interpreted literally, this means that
the certainty equivalent of $10,000 with probability .5 and $20,000 with
probability .5 is $14,591, suggesting that these employees are essentially
risk neutralj3 The estimated value of k, 1.483, indicstes that, in deciding
whether to retire, a dollar of income while retired is given more weight than
a dollar of income while working. The ratio of the utility of retirement to
the utility of employment is [l.483(8/Y)J'523. It is 1 when 8/1 —0.67.The
real discount rate is estimated at .014. This is an unusually low estimate,
based on our experience to date with this modelj4
Alternative specifications were also estimated but are not reported here.
One parameterized k as a function of age. Although this specification fits
the data better than the specification reported above, simulations like those
reported below are not appreciably affected. 15
C. The Model Fit.
To evaluate the model fit, the predicted versus actual retirement rates
are shown in figure 2. The first panel of the figure shows the proportion of
persons employed at age 50 who still would be in the firm at subsequent ages,
13Logarithmic utility is clearly rejected by the data, based on the Wald
statistic.
14Eatimated discount rates for salesmen have typically been above .15.
Thua we do not at this stage of our work attach much significance to the exact
rate estimated here.
15For more detail on these other specifications see Lumsdaine, Stock, and
Wise [19891.(15)
based on the annual retirement (hazard) rates that are shown in the bottom
panel of the figure.16 In general the model fits the data rather well. There
are two exceptions: It overpredicts the hazard rates between 56 and 59; thus
the cumulative rates in subsequent years, as shown in the top panel, are
somewhat overpredicted between 55 and 65. And, the retirement rate at 65, is
substantially underpredicted. Although the small sample size at age 65 does
not support strong conclusions based on these estimates alone, our experience
with other employee groups suggests that the model typically underpredicts age
65 retirement rates. As can be seen in figure 1, wage earnings and retirement
income do not suggest an abrupt jump in retirement at 65 as compared to the
jump that the figure suggests at 55. Most employees in this firm have retired
before 65, so the effect on overall retirement of the hazard rate at 65 is
small. Nonetheless, these results and the results of our prior estimation all
point to a "customary retirement effect" or a "Social Security retirement
effect" at age 65, and possibly at age 62 as well, that is not due to an
abrupt change in wage earnings or retirement income at that particular age.17
16The "actual" values in the bottom panel in figure 2 were computedas
the fraction of workers in each age group who retired in 1980. The
"predicted" values were computed from the estimated model. The cumulative
hazard in the top part of figure 2 was computed by cumulating the annual
hazards in the bottom panel using the formula hi —1-II1(lf)
where f is
the annual hazard in the bottom half of the figure for ge j and i runs over
ages. The annual and cumulative hazards presented in figures 3 through 9 were
computed analogously. The data that correspond to figures 2, 3, and 4 are
shown in Lumsdaine, Stock, and Wise [1989].
17The "actual" rates -- thesample rates -- areof course only estimates
themselves. Except at age 65, the predicted rates always lie within a 95
percent confidence band (for the true rates) around the "actual" sample rates.
Lunisdaine, Stock, and Wise [1989] show that the fit is somewhat better when k
is parameterized as a function of age. The utility function (kB(r))l can be
interpreted as the utility associated with a dollar of income while retired.
Maintaining this interpretation, its value might be expected to rise with age,
not because the dollar itself is worth more but because retirement is.
Holding income constant, retirement (leisure) may be increasingly desired as
the person ages. To capture this possibility, k was parametrized as k —k0/[l +exp(-k1(A-k2))].Recalling the ratio of the utilities of retirement to(16)
D. Predictive Validity.
The simulated effect of the 1982 window plan is shown in figure 3.The
base case represents the simulated rates under the usual plan provisions. The
simulated retirement rates under the window plan exceed those in the absence
of the plan by almost two fold in some instances. For example the simulated
hazard rate at age 60 is .193 without the window plan and .364 with it. Of
persons employed at age 52, about 52 percent retire by age 60 under the normal
plan; with the window plan in effect, almost 79 percent are estimated to
retire by age 60, an increase of over 50 percent.18
In order of magnitude, the effect of the window plan is comparable to the
effect of changing the plan early retirement age, a key feature of the pension
plan. Whereas almost 49 percent of persons employed at 50 leave the firm
before age 60 with the early retirement age at 55 (based on the estimates for
1980), only about 35 percent would leave before 60 if the early retirement age
were at age 60, a reduction of about 28 percent. Similarly, were the early
retirement age at 60, a reduction to 55 would increase by about 39 percent the
proportion that would leave before age 60.19 Thus the window plan magnifies
the already large effect of the pension plan early retirement provisions.
employment, [k(35/Y5))', if k is very small retirement will be unlikely even
if B/Y is large; if k is large retirement is likely even if B/Y is small. The
results suggest an increasing desire for retirement leisure with age.
18Because the youngest person in the 1982 sample is 52, the cumulative
calculations start at that age. In figure 3 we have adjusted the 1982 data by
using the age 50 and age 51 retirement rates from 1980 and 1981.
19The details of these calculations are reported in Lumsdaine, Stock, and
Vise [1989].(17)
A natural way to aasess the predictive validity of the model is to
consider the extent to which the predicted (i.e. simulated) retirement rstes
agree with the actual rates under the window plan. The evidence is shown in
figure 4. As a reminder of the extent to which the window plan changed the
typical retirement behavior, the actual 1981 retirement rates are also shown.
The top panel of the figure summarizes the results. It is evident from a
comparison of the 1981 and 1982 rates that the effect of the window plan on
retirement was substantial. The window plan was not announced prior to its
effective date. Thus there should have been no anticipation of it, leading to
reduced retirement in 1981 while waiting for the more favorable 1982 terms.20
Thus a good external test of the predictive validity of the model is its
ability to predict actual retirement rates in 1982, rates that were much
different than they would have been without the window plan. In general the
correspondence between the actual and predicted rates is rather close. The
simulated proportion of those employed at age 50 who would retire by age 60
under the window plan almost matches the actual proportion, .795 versus .770
respectively. The simulated results, however, overpredict annual retirement
rates from 55 to 58 and underpredict for older ages. This can be seen clearly
in the annual hazard rates reported in the bottom panel of the figure.
The parameter estimates for men were also used to predict the effect of
the window plan on women. Although not shown here, the prediction for women,
based on the parameter estimates for men, seems to match the actual retirement
experience of women better than the predictions for men match their actual
20The 1981 retirement rates are essentially the same as those in 1980and
these are in turn virtually the same as those in 1983, the year after the
window plan.(18)
experience. In summary, the model clearly captures the pattern and magnitude
of the effects of the window plan, but underpredicts somewhat the effect on
the small proportion of employees that would otherwise remain in the firm at
older ages.
III. "Optimal" Window Plan.
It is clear from the discussion above that the window plan in this firm
had a dramatic effect on retirement rates during the year that it was in
effect. Thus it is apparent that such bonus plans can be sn important
manpower management tool. We consider next the possibility of choosing an
efficient plan, based on mansgerial goals. To make the idea concrete, we
consider in particular whether in this firm the same outcomes could have been
achieved at less cost with an alternative window plan. To illustrate the
possible effects of larger bonuses and to motivate the possible advantages of
targeting certain groups of employees, we first simulate the effects of two
simple plans that provide the same bonus for all older employees.
A. Six versus Twelve Month Bonuses for Everyone.
The firm plan offered bonuses ranging from 3 to 12 months salary to
vested employees between 55 and 69. Suppose instead that each employee
between 55 and 69 were eligible for a bonus of six months salary if he were to
retire in 1982. The simulated effect of such a plan is shown in figure 5,
together with the simulated retirement rates with no window plan and with the
firm's plan. The figure also shows the simulated effect of offering each
employee a 12 month salary bonus. The effect of both the 6 and the 12 month
bonus plans is large, but the figure makes it clear that the increase in
retirement rates from the addition of the second 6 months is much less than(19)
the increase from the first 6 months. A total of 55.7 retirements are induced
by the six-month and 80.8 by the twelve-month plan, according to the
simulations. (Without the window plan, 91.0 employees would retire; 146.7
are estimated to retire under the 6-month and 171.8 under the 12-month bonus.)
In both cases the relative increase in retirement rates is greater foryounger
than older employees. Thus, the illustration suggests that if the goal were
to reduce the number of older employees, it would be best to targetyounger
rather than older workers in the 55 to 65 age group. Those closer to 65 have
high retirement rates with no bonus at all, and thus the marginal effect of
the bonus is smaller.
B. Parameterizing the Window Plan.
Like most window plans, the plan at this firm provided bonuses to a
rather broad group of employees. The amount of the bonus payment was
determined by age and years of service. A natural question is whether another
plan, offering a different schedule of payments, might be more efficient than
the firm's plan. For example, could another plan achieve the same results at
lower cost? In general, to find such a plan requires that a bonus be selected
for each age and years of service combination. While conceptually
straightforward, this direct approach is computationally cumbersome;
optimization is over a large number of parameters, given by the number ofages
times the possible number of years of service. We therefore adopt an
alternative approach based on parameterization of the schedule of bonus
payments by age and years of service. We use a variant of the beta
distribution to provide a flexible functional form that can describe a wide
range of possibilities. Months of bonus payment are given by(20)
(11) Months —f*r(,)r()[(1X-1)x-1]
where x —(age
-55)/15.The standard beta distribution is defined for
variable values between 0 and 1. The transformation of x allows age to range
from 55 (x —0)to 70 (x —I).The maximum of 70 is chosen because the firm's
mandatory retirement age was 70. The central tendency of the density along
the age dimension is allowed to vary with years of service, by letting
—- ofservice -55).The parameter £ is a normalizing factor
that determines the overall level of payments. Alternative plans are defined
by different parameter values in equation (11).
Because we use the "beta description" of the firm's plan as a base
case, we need to verify that the beta formulation can accurately approximate
that plan. The beta description of the firm's plan was obtained by fitting
the specification in equation (11) to the actual window plan payment schedule,
using least squares. Even though the firm's schedule varies discontinuously
by age and years of service, the approximation fits the actual schedule rather
closely. The root mean squared error of the predicted versus actual bonus for
employees with 10 to 40 years of service is 1.17 months of salary, less than
10 percent of the typical bonus. More important for our purposes, the
predicted departure rates using the actual firm bonus payments correspond
closely to the predicted rates using the beta summaryofthe firm's plan. The
cumulative and the annual hazard rates based on the actual and fitted payments
are shown in figure 6.
C. Selecting OptimumPlans.
Whether a window plan is efficient depends, of course, on the goal of the
plan. In line with prominent explanations for such plans, we consider two(21)
goals: one is to reduce the wage bill, through retirement of older workers;
the other is to reduce the number of older employees, without particular
concern for labor cost.
1. Reducing LaborCost.
Suppose that the firm wishes to reduce labor cost. We translate labor
cost to mean the present discounted value of the expected futurewage bill.
We then select a window plan to minimize the future wages that the firmwould
otherwise expect to pay to the firm'scurrentolder employees before they
retire, plus the cost of the window plan bonus payments. Here, we consider





Here, N is the number of employees (taken to be the 563 employees in our
sample who were employed on January 1, 1982), i indexes employees, a isage, r
is the discount rate (assumed to be 5 percent), H(tI) is theprobability that
a person will still be employed at future ages t, x includes all of the
measured determinants of retirement including the window bonus, Y ispredicted
future annual salary, and C is the expected window plan bonuspayment. The
number of months of salary under the window plan is H.21Minimization of
equation (12) is with respect to the beta function parameters in equation
(11), which in turn determine the bonus months H.
21The forecasting of future salary is basedon individual age, years of
service, and current salary, as well as the salaries of other firm employees.
The procedure is described in Stock and Wise [1988bJ.(22)
The optimal plan bonus schedule is shown in table 2. For comparison, the
table also shows the beta approximation to the firm's plan. There are three
noticeable differences between the two. First, the optimal plan offers much
lower bonuses on average. This is consistent with the declining marginal
effect of additional bonus dollars on departure rates, illustrated in figure
5.Second, the optimal plan offers the highest payments to younger employees.
Because younger employees could work for many more years, inducing them to
leave has the greatest effect on the expected future wage bill. Third, years
of service is not an important determinant of the bonus in the optimal plan.
The actual firm plan costs $4.07 million and saves $6.42 million in
expected labor costs. Thus the reduction in future salary payment to the
older employees is offset in large part by the cost of the window plan itself;
the reduction in net labor coat is only $2.35 million. Were the firm's goal
to reduce labor cost, the simulations suggest that it could do much better
than this. The cost of the optimal window plan is only $2.91 million, yet it
aaves $6.08 million in expected salaries (95 percent of the salary reduction
achieved by the firm plan). The net labor coat reduction achieved by the
optimal plan is $3.17 million, almost 35 percent more than the reduction
achieved by firm plan. Even though the cost of the optimal window plan is
only 71 percent of the cost of the firm plan, it induces almost 95 percent as
many retirements 22
22The optimal plans were determined using a modified simulated annealing
algorithm. This random search algorithm was adopted to avoid potential local
optima in choosing the plan parameters. For the cost minimizing plan, the
minimization of equation (12) was done without any constraints. To determine
the plan that induces the maximum number of retirements, and the plan that
maximizes the reduction in future employee years, it was necessary to impose
the inequality constraint that the total predicted coat of the optimal plan be
no greater than the predicted cost of the actual firm plan. This was achieved
by penalizing the objective function if the cost of the optimal plan exceeded
the firm plan cost.(23)
The departure rates induced by the optimal Cost minimizing plan versus
the firm plan are shown in figure 7. Consistent with larger bonuses for the
older employees, the firm plan has a greater effect than the optimal plan on
the retirement rates of employees 58 and older.
2. Inducing Retirements.
The goal of the firm may be to reduce the number of older employees,
without major concern for the salaries that they would receive. It is clear
from the results above that the cost minimizing plan costs much less in bonus
payments per induced retirement than the firm's plan --$19,152versus
$25,046. This is due to the rapidly diminishing returns to marginal bonus
dollars with respect to induced retirement, as is made clear by the cost of
the six- versus twelve-month plans, shown at the bottom of table 3.
In addition to the cost-minimizing plan, we selected a plan to maximize
the number of induced retirements, setting the plan cost equal to the cost of
the firm window plan (i.e. $4.07 million). As table 3 shows, the maximum
employment reduction is 163.7, only about 1 percent greater than the number of
retirements induced by the firm plan. This indicates that no reallocation of
the dollars that the firm spent could significantly increase the number of
retirements, although the cost per induced retirement could be much lower.
3. Reducing Future Years of Employment.
An alternative to inducing retirements is to reduce the number of future
years of employment by older workers. In effect, this weights each induced
retirement by the number of future years the person would have been expected
to work in the a1sence of the window plan. The plan that yields the maximum
reduction in future years of employment, setting the cost at the cost of the
firm window plan, reduces expected future employee years by 264.1 (from 1768.7(24)
to 1504.6). This is about 12 percent more than the reduction achieved by the
firm plan. Thus even though it is not possible to induce more retirements
than were induced by the firm plan --giventhe same plan cost -- anoptimally
chosen plan could reduce future employee years somewhat more than the firm
plan did.
IV. Summary and Discussion.
Early retirement window plans have become commonplace in the United
States in recent years. Based on the option value model of retirement
developed in earlier papers, this paper emphasizes the selection of the most
efficient plan. Three objectives are considered: minimizing expected labor
cost, maximizing induced retirement, and minimizing expected man-years of work
by older employees. The analysis is based on data from a large Fortune 500
firm. In emphasizing the potential to select plans to achieve a given goal,
the paper compares the effects of "optimal" plans with the effects of the firm
plan.
The paper first highlights the power of window plans to induce early
retirement. The firm's plan --providingbonus payments of 3 to 12 months
salary -- increasedretirement rates by up to two fold. Such a plan would
increase by 50 percent the proportion of workers employed at 52 that has
retired by age 60. These large increases in retirement rates are predicted
rather well by the option value model, suggesting that the model also could
serve as a basis for finding optimal window plans. This firm's window plan
was unanticipated and was not followed by other such plans. The effect of an
anticipated or recurring series of window plans may differ from the effect of(25)
the firm's plan. The optimal design of sequences of plans is left for future
analysis.
As discussed in the introduction, there are several possible reasons for
window plans. One is that older workers are paid more than their marginal
products -- andby implication that the wages of older workers cannot be
reduced sufficiently to equate them to their marginal revenue products -- and
thus the window, like defined benefit pension plans more generally, is used to
induce older workers to retire. This explanation is in line with the most
prevalent theoretical explanation for the structure of defined benefit pension
plans.23 A second reason is that the retirement of the older employees makes
room for the advancement of younger employees, thereby providing an incentive
to younger workers to remain with the firm. Part the opportunity cost of
retaining older employees is slower advancement for younger workers. A third
reason is simply that the window plan provides a convenient way to reduce the
size of the firm's workforce, without having to resort to layoffs. The latter
two explanations are often cited by firm executives as the motivation for
window plans.
Although our results do not provide direct evidence on the actual
motivation for the firm's plan, three Sets of findings provide some insight
into the likelihood of alternative goals, and, by implication, the goals of
other firms that have adopted similar plans.
First, given the cost of the firm's plan, we were unable to find a plan
that would induce more older employees to retire, if this were the goal of the
plan. Thus if the firm's goal were to induce as many retirements as possible,
23See Lazear (1979](26)
the window plan that it selected achieved about as much as was possible, given
the plan cost. In contrast, if the goal were to minimize the expected present
value of the wage bill of older workers (or to maximize the reduction in
future older-employee.years) optimal plans could be found that were much
better than the firm's plan. According to our results, the bonuses offered
under the firm's plan are too large to be consistent with minimizing the
expected future wage bill. The plan chosen to minimize expected labor cost
would induce almost 95 percent as many retirements as were induced by the
firm's plan, but at only 71 percent of the cost of the firm's plan. This is
possible because of the declining marginal effect of bonus payments on induced
retirement. For example, over 85 percent of the retirement effect of a 12-
month bonus to each employee 55 and older could be achieved with a 6-month
bonus to each employee. The current cost of the firm's plan (just over $4
million) is 63 percent of the expected future reduction in labor costs; the
ratio is 48 percent under the cost minimizing plan.
Second, the results can be used to calculate implied bounds on the
expected future marginal products of the older workers who are induced to
retire. Suppose that the firm's goal were to maximize the reduction in the
future wage bill less the revenue product of the retiring workers. Including
the cost of the window plan itself, the net reduction in future labor costs
due to the firm's plan is 4.9 percent (from $47.64 to $45.29 million). But
the plan reduces expected discounted years of future employment of older
workers by 13.6 percent.24 Consider two extreme cases: first, assume that
24To obtain this figure, future years ofemployment are discounted at the
same rate (5 percent) used to discount real salaries. This was computed using
(12) by setting Y to 1.0 for each worker and by dropping the term inC. The
resulting expected discounted future employee-years are: no window plan,
1520.5; firm plan, 1314.5; optimal cost-minizing plan, 1325.9.(27)
the marginal product of older workers who leave is the same as those who stay.
Under this assumption, the 13.6 percent reduction in employment of older
workers represents a 13.6 percent reduction in the expected present value of
the revenue product of older workers. In this case, then, the plan results in
a net loss of 8.7 percent. At the other extreme, assume that the marginal
revenue product of the workers who leave is zero -- eithertheir physical
product could be zero, or there could be inadequate demand for the output of
the firm. In this case, the plan represents a net savings of 4.9 percent.
The "break-even" value of the marginal revenue product of the departing
workers -- suchthat the reduction in labor cost is equal to the reduction in
the value of production --canbe determined by equating the reduction in
expected future labor cost to the reduction in expected future revenues:
.049w —•133er,where w is labor cost, e is employment and r is average
marginal revenue product per employee. Thus for the firm to break even
implies that w/er —.133/.049—2.71.That is, on average the retiring
employees would have to have been paid over 2.7 times their marginal revenue
for the firm's window plan to have a zero effect on net profit.
Third, even the cost-minimizing optimal window is ill designed if the
goal is to increase firm profitability by retiring older employees whose
salaries exceed their marginal products. For the cost-minimizing plan to
achieve this goal, salaries of older workers would have to exceed their
marginal products by at least a factor of over 1.9, assuming that the plan
does not target specific employees with low productivity relative to their
wages. Under the cost-minimizing plan, labor cost is reduced by 6.7 percent
and years of older worker employment by 12.8 percent.
Although we can only speculate about the firm's motivations, we consider
these three observations to weigh against the likelihood that the window plan(28)
was primarily aimed at retiring older workers because they are paid more than
their marginal products. Were this the firm's objective, the simulations
suggest it could have done better with a much less costly plan. And the
implied magnitude of the rents being earned by older workers (wages 2.7 times
marginal revenue product) strikes us as implausible. Moreover, were the plan
to target the least productive workers, the firm would save at most 4.9
percent of the expected wage bill of older workers, assuming the marginal
product of the employees who are induced to retire would otherwise be zero.
It is clear, however, that the plan does not explicitly target individual
employees: the bonus schedule depends only on age and years of service.
Without targeting individuals, there seems no reason to believe that the
employees with the highest salary to productivity ratios would be the most
likely to leave. Rather, these employees are likely to have a more
advantageous position with this firm than they could obtain with another firm,
and thus would be the least likely to leave. To the extent that employees
leave this firm to take another job, those with the highest productivity
relative to their wage arguably are the most likely to find a better job
elsewhere and thus would be the most likely to leave this firm. Nonetheless,
as a logical possibility, the retiring workers might be paid much more than
their marginal revenue product and this might have been the motivation for the
window, but if so the plan was ill-designed and the older employees were
unproductive indeed.
Thus, based on these data it is unlikely in our judgment that the goal of
the window plan was to induce older workers to retire because their
productivity was low relative to their salaries. The evidence is more
consistent with a desire to reduce the overall size of the labor force, or to(29)
reduce the number of older employees to allow promotion of younger employees.
The window plan is a convenient and powerful means of reducing employment
without having to resort to layoffs.(30)
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Econometrica.Table 1. Firm window plan: approximate bonus months by age and years of service.
Years Age of
55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 6667 68 69 Service
10-190.01.7 4.26.79.0 10.9 12.3 13.1 13.2 12.5 l1.1 9.0 6.3 3.1 0.0
20-290.0 3.46.4 8.8 10.6 11.9 12.5 12.5 12.0 10.99.4 7.3 4.9 2.3 0.0
30-390.1 6.39.2 11.0 11.9 12.3 12.1 11.4 10.49.17.5 5.7 3.7 1.7 0.0
40-491.5 11.0 12.5 12.8 12.5 11.8 10.99.78.47.0 5.6 4.1 2.6 1.1 0.0Table 2. Bonus schedule for the f ins plan versus optimal plans.
Years Age
Service 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 6667 6869
Bets Aporoximation to Fin Plan
10-190.01.74.26.79.0 10.9 12.3 13.1 13.2 12.5 11.1 9.0 6.3 3.1 0.0
20-290.03.46.48.8 10.6 11.9 12.5 12.5 12.0 10.99.4 7.3 4.9 2.3 0.0
30-390.1 6.39.2 11.0 11.9 12.3 12.1 11.4 10.4 9.17.5 5.7 3.7 1.7 0.0
40-491.5 11.0 12.5 12.8 12.5 11.8 10.99.78.47.05.6 4.1 2.6 1.1 0.0
Ontimal Cost-MinimizinePlan
16.013.8 11.3 9.17.25.54.13.0 2.0 L3
16.1 13.8 11.3 9.17.25.5 4.1 3.0 2.01.3
16.2 13.8 11.3 9.17.25.5 4.1 3.0 2.01.3
16.3 13.8 11.3 9.17.25.54.13.0 2.01.3
OotimslCurrent-Retirement-Maxitsizinr Plan
15.714.1 13.0 11.9 10.99.88.77.7 6.65.5
16.8 14.3 13.1 11.9 10.89.88.77.66.5 55
18.0 14.4 13.1 11.9 108 9.78.6 7.6 6.55.4
19.3 14.6 13.2 11.9 10.89.78.67.5 6.45.4
OotimalFuture-Labor-Years-Minimizing Plan
19.313.4 12.2 11.2 10.39.4 85 7.6 6.7 57
22.1 13.7 12.3 11.2 10.29.3 8.4 7.56.55.6
25.4 14.0 12.4 11.2 10.2 9.2 8.37.36.45.5













0.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
0.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
0.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
0.7 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0
4.4 3.4 2.3 1.2 0.0
44 33 2.2 1.1 0.0
4.4 3.3 2.2 1.1 0.0
4.3 3.2 2.2 1.1 0.0
4.8 3.8 2.8 1.6 0.0
4.7 3.7 2.7 1.6 0.0
4.6 3.6 2.6 1.5 0.0















No Window $0.00 $0.00 $47.64 91.0 1768.7
Firm Window 4.07 6.42 45.29 162.5 1532.8
Beta Approx.to Firm
Window 4.00 5.84 45.80 157.5 1554.1
Cost Minimizing Window 2.91 6.08 44.47 151.9 1542.9
Max. Induced
Retirements Window,
Given Firm Window Cost 4.07 6.96 44.75 163.7 1512.0
Max. Reduction in Future
Employee Years Window,
Given Firm Window Cost 4.07 7.12 44.59 161.6 1504.6
Six-Month Bonus for All 2.31 5.20 44.75 146.7 1578.0
Twelve-Month Bonus for All5.41 7.55 45.50 171.8 1492.1
Note: All values are calculated for the persons in our sample who were 55 and older and
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Note:The bottom panel shows departure (hazard> rates by age. Thetop panelShows
theImplied proportion of workers employed at age 60 whowould hav, left thefirm
bysubsequent age., based on the departure rates by age shown In the bottom panel.Figure 3. Simulated effect in 1982 of 1982 window
plan instead of usual plan provisions, based on
1980 parameter estimates.
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Note rh. bottom panel shows departure (hazard) ratea by age. The top panel ahowa
the implied proportion of worker, employed at age 50 who wouid have left the tirm by
subsequent ages, based on the departure rates by age shown in the bottom panel.
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Annual Departure RatesFigure 4. Actual retirement rates in 1981 and 1982 vs.
simulated 1982 retirement rates under the window
plan, based on 1980 parameter estimates.
Cumulatlv• Departure Ratee
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Age
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60 62 64 66 68 60 62 64 66
Ag.
Note; The bottom panel shows departure (hazard) rate. by age.Thetop panel shows
the implied proportIon of workers employed at age 60 who would have left the firm by
subsequent age., based on the departurs rites by age shown In th. bottom panel.Figure 5. Simulated retirement rates under a
window plan with a 6-month and a 12-month







50 62 54 66 68 60 62 64 66
Ag.
Note: The bottom panel shows departure (hazard) ratesbyage. The top panel shows
the implied proportion of workers employed at age 60 who would have left the firm by
subsequent ages, based on th. departure rates by age shown In the bottom panel.
60 52 64 66 68
Ag.
60 62 64 66Figure 6. Annual simulated 1982 retirement rates
under the firm plan versus retirement rates under
the beta approximation to the firm plan.
Cumulative Departure Rates
Note: TI,. bottom panel shows departure (hazard) rates by age. The top panel shows
the Implied proportion of workers employed at age 60 who would have left the firm
by subaequ.nty ages, based on the departure rates by age shown in the bottom panel.
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60 62 64 66Figure 7. Departure rates induced by the




60 62 64 66 68 60 62 64 66
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Note:The bottompanel shows departure (hazard) rites by age. The top panel Shows
the Implied proportion of workers employed at age 60 who would hive left the firm
by subsequent ages, based on th. departure rates by age shown In the bottom panel.Figure 8. Departure rates induced by the
optimal current-retirement-maximizing
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Note: The bottom panel ahowi departure (hazard) rate. by age. The top panel ahowa
the lmpll•d proportIon of workers employed it age 60 who would have left the fIrm
by subsequent ages, based on the departure rates by age shown In the bottom panel.Figure 9. Departure rates induced by the
optimal future-labor-years-minimizing
plan versus the firm's plan.
Age
Note: Th. bottom panel shows departure (hazard) rates by age. The top panel shows
the Implied proportion of workers employed at age 60 who would have i.ft the firm
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